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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PERSPECTIVE OF THE
DEVELOPING WORLD
Peter Gakunu *
One of the main preoccupations of diplomats is always saying
"Thank you", and I think I should start by expressing my gratitude
for being invited here in these beautiful surroundings. I have never
been to this part of the United States before. For me, this is a very
unique opportunity. I am also glad to note that under these beautiful
and serene surroundings I might stumble into somebody that I perhaps
went to school with. Unfortunately, I would need to start going back
to school to join the eminent lawyers in these surroundings.
That having been said, I very much regret that Ambassador Batista
from Brazil will not be here this afternoon because I would like for
him to present the viewpoint of the developing countries from Brazil's
perspective. As you know, the problems of Brazil are not really the
problems of most developing countries. In fact, the problems of
Brazil in the ongoing GATT negotiations are not problems of any
developing country. Brazil is in a unique situation in these negotiations. But since the Ambassador is not here, I will try to present a
comprehensive developing country perspective.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As you have already been informed, I work for an organization
called ACP that consists of 66 countries from Africa, the Caribbean
and the Pacific. They are all developing countries with most of them
at the lower end of development. So you will understand my sentiments when I speak about the problems or the perspectives of
developing countries in the context of the Uruguay Round. You can
imagine the daunting tasks that they face.
I shall not define the negotiating mandate on trade-related aspects
of intellectual property (TRIP) because Mr. Kakabadse tried to indicate this morning generally what the negotiating mandate is in the
case of TRIP. I will begin my remarks by trying to give from my
own perspective the viewpoint of both the developed countries and
of the developing countries. The interpretation of the mandate by
the developed countries, in particular the United States, Japan, or
* Chief, Trade Cooperation Division; African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of
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the European Community, is that the negotiations should come out
with global standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The developing countries, however, emphasize
that the negotiations should merely clarify existing GATT provisions
on the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, and they
consider negotiations and global criteria for intellectual property protection to be outside the scope of the GATT. I think you will
immediately see my position vis-d-vis my predecessors.
While the developing countries only consider it a matter of clarification, in contrast the developed countries think they must come
out with a legal framework. It is still necessary, however, for the
developing countries to be prepared for either alternative, just in
case. In other words, they must be prepared for a situation in which
either clarification of relevant GATT provisions or a full-fledged
GATT agreement on the protection and development of intellectual
property rights is concluded. But it should also be noted that the
negotiations may not yield any agreement at all, in which case adaptions of existing agreements may have to be considered.
The extent to which substantive standards on intellectual property
protection are to be covered under the GATT framework is still an
open question. However, it would seem inappropriate, at least from
a developing country point of view, for the GATT to duplicate
complimentary initiatives that take place already in WIPO and other
international organizations, because I do not think that the negotiations on intellectual property are intended to renegotiate the existing
conventions. It would further appear inappropriate for the GATT to
negotiate modifications of these conventions. Therefore, the precise
relationship between any new GATT rules and the work undertaken
in these other international organizations needs to be clarified first.
Are we going to negotiate new agreements, new conventions, or
are we going to amend existing conventions? If we are going to amend
existing conventions, who is more competent to do it? Is it the GATT
or WIPO or other institutions that are already entrusted with those
conventions? If we are going to negotiate new conventions, what
measures will they include in relation to those that already exist?
It would also be inappropriate to require developing countries to
adopt any new rules in this area that may be inconsistent with their
national development interests. The emphasis on development interests
is not necessarily the same as special and differential treatment for
developing countries which developed countries want to have eliminated. Of course this does not mean that the developing countries
should not continue to resist these moves.
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With or without special and differential treatment, the promotion
of national development, which has always been central to the operation of intellectual property regimes not only for developing but
also for the developed countries, must be reflected in negotiations
on trade-related intellectual property rights. If we take the first approach, whereby the negotiations will be limited to clarifications of
the few GATT provisions relating to intellectual property rights, then
this would preclude the establishment of a new global regime on
intellectual property protection.
This approach would seem to bring a lot of pressures, but it would
be preferable for developing countries because it would avoid conflict
with existing international instruments. If we have to follow this road,
the approach will leave developing countries open to bilateral pressures
to modify their policies and measures, without the benefit of any
multilaterally agreed criteria. In other words, there would be no
multilateral protection for developing countries. Therefore, if this
approach is successful, in the final analysis, there will be a need to
ensure that such bilateral pressures which may be accepted by developing countries are strictly within the GATT dispute settlement
procedures, so that these pressures will not be used as restrictive
trade barriers.
If the second approach is taken (that is, the approach which the
developed countries are proposing where they emphasize the advancement of global economic interests), then developing countries
must out of necessity introduce counter-proposals designed to preserve
and even to broaden the scope of national development objectives
which are in direct contradiction with the positions taken earlier this
afternoon. This is a necessary feature because there is a need to
balance intellectual property rights, like any other rights, with corresponding obligations.
There is much, for example, in the historical evolution and even
in the current practice of developed countries which warrants the
introduction of technological and economic development objectives
into the negotiations quite apart from the fact that economic development is one of the declared objectives of the negotiations as a
whole. In the event that there is no such balance between the trend
to liberalization as proposed by the developed countries and the
development objectives of developing countries, it would obviously
not be in the interests of developing countries to subscribe to any
other type of agreement. While this may lead to the intensification
of bilateral pressures, it would also mean that renewed efforts need
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to be made to pursue or reactivate other initiatives in WIPO and
elsewhere.
These are the general aspects of the problem, but I come back to
the basic principles of the issue of intellectual property. As with most
proposals of the developed countries, the central theme here is that
increased global protection of intellectual property rights will lead to
increased trade liberalization and generate increased economic growth
and development for all countries. This is the main objective of
liberalization of trade in this area. However, such increased protection
is equally likely to strengthen the use of intellectual property rights
in ways that might restrict international trade and the transfers of
technology. Moreover, intellectual property policies pursued earlier
by many OECD countries themselves differ from those that are now
embodied in their proposals for negotiations on TRIP.
The promotion of national technological and industrial development
has always been the main rationale for the protection of intellectual
property rights. In this regard, the national treatment standard which
is embodied in the Paris and Berne Conventions has always allowed
each country the right to determine its own level of protection. There
is therefore no justification for departing from this standard or
substituting for it any other. This point was made in the reverse way
to justify the need to introduce a new system. I do not see the
justification for a new system from a developing country's point of
view. This is particularly so because the GATT negotiations do not
intend to amend existing conventions or replace existing institutions
in this area. Since the ultimate objective of intellectual property
protection and trade liberalization is economic growth and development, development considerations must therefore override all others
in determining levels of intellectual property protection.
At the present time, even though the discussions are only at a
preliminary stage, they have demonstrated the necessity for each
country to fashion its intellectual property laws on the basis of its
own economic conditions and needs. In fact, this is why the United
States has brought the question of intellectual property into the
context of the GATT: because of the United States's own economic
conditions and needs.
Now, the principles that have been suggested, namely, national
treatment, MFN, and reciprocity, are not superior to those that are
embodied in the existing regime. The national treatment standard
under the GATT is of course designed to ensure equal internal
treatment for imported and domestic products, rather than for intellectual property. Its application to intellectual property protection
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in the GATT context should not involve any departure from the
Paris and the Berue Convention standards, which also require equal
treatment for nationals and foreigners in the protection of intellectual
property. National treatment should not be interpreted to mean treatment on the basis of global or externally imposed criteria. When you
look at the reciprocity standard, it has only recently been introduced
unilaterally in the U.S. legislation in order to protect semi-conductor
chips and to pressure other countries to adopt similar legislation in
bilateral agreements with other countries. If the reciprocity standard
is to be applied to all intellectual property rights, it would arguably
be a violation of the national treatment standard, since countries can
withhold such treatment if this standard is not met.
Secondly, for most developing countries, and certainly for the ACP
states, reciprocity will be devoid of any real meaning since these
countries are importers rather than exporters of technology. They do
not produce any technology, so reciprocity would not be a good
thing to introduce in this particular area for these countries. Developing countries would be required to treat technology imports on the
basis of externally imposed criteria in return for an empty commitment
of reciprocal treatment from the other side. That cannot work.
Thirdly, reciprocity would be a regression from non-discrimination,
since it will lead to discriminatory treatment of nationals whose
countries cannot reciprocate. It would also be inconsistent with the
general principles governing negotiations, because developing countries would be required to reciprocate, and in terms of the ongoing
negotiations, these countries are supposed to get special and differential treatment in all areas. In fact, one of the conditions of the
negotiations is that after they are completed there will be mechanisms
to ensure that developing countries are not made to reciprocate in
those areas that they are not required to.
Therefore, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to stretch the
GATT standards of national treatment and MFN to cover intellectual
property protection. There can be no justification for superimposing
a reciprocity standard on this convention. This would be a violation
of and a regression from national treatment and non-discrimination.
I need to make a few other points here. First, to the extent that
the various OECD proposals would require a degree of uniformity
in intellectual property laws in all countries, they tend to overlook
or ignore diverse technological and economic conditions amongst
countries. It is very difficult to come out with a common standard
of law that is enforceable. To legislate global uniformity in the face
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of global diversity and plurality would not be sensible or wise for
most developing countries.
Second, such an approach would duplicate the rigidity of the
original GATT framework-which has proved difficult to rectify in
a satisfactory manner over the past 40 years.
Perhaps I need to give a specific example of patents. I would like
to touch on that briefly because among the developing countries the
background of these negotiations is a picture of overwhelming foreign
dominance in patent protection. There have been low levels of local
working of patents granted, and the predominant use of these patents
as trade monopolies or as privately controlled non-tariff barriers.
Therefore, negotiations in this area should be oriented towards facilitating increased access to technology and increased local working
of such technology if the objectives of trade liberalization and development are to be achieved. In fact, earlier it was said that examples
were being given of patent exclusions. For example, in the case of
pharmaceutical products, out of the forty-nine exclusions only eight
of them apply to African countries; the rest of them apply to other
countries. So you can see where the problem really is in terms of
the effect.
In any case these exclusions occur in developed and in developing
countries as well, mostly for technical reasons. For example, certain
sensitive subjects were not includable for reasons of public health.
Thus, it is difficult to conceive of a standard prescription for the
treatment of this problem by all countries. Such a prescription would
seem, in any case, to be futile for the most part, since this is an
area highly subject to omnibus exclusions for public health and/or
public policy or security reasons. So the laws would have to be rigged
with exceptions. They would not be really effective laws in terms of
intellectual property protection.
With respect to the other comment made on local working and
compulsory licensing requirements, there is no particular problem
with the inclusion of such a requirement. The problem is in the
question what should be its terms. The developing countries note
that for periods approaching a century or more and until very recently,
a number of industrialized countries, including the United States,
used patent non-use as grounds for nullification. The use of compulsory licensing has been accepted as a hard-fought compromise in
the Paris Convention, to replace the more common penalty of nullification for patent non-use in the late 19th century. Now, most
European countries maintain compulsory licensing requirements in
their laws for reasons similar to those advanced by developing coun-
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tries. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate for the developing
countries to accept the abolition of the compulsory licensing requirements, and there does not seem to be any convincing justification
for its abolition.
I will stop here for the time being. I would like to conclude in
the following way. The developing countries prefer an agreement
which is geared towards the promotion of technological and industrial
development, rather than trade liberalization per se. This means that
each country would continue to be free to determine the terms and
conditions of protection within its territory in the context of prevailing
international conventions and agreements. International protection of
intellectual property must be on the basis of national treatment which
ensures non-discrimination as between nationals and foreigners and
as between different foreign nationals. Reciprocity is an unwarranted
regression from this standard.
There cannot be uniformity in the substantive content of intellectual
property laws, given the wide disparities in the underlying socioeconomic conditions and needs at the national level. On this point
I need to refer particularly to the developing countries in cases where
they are taking structural adjustment programs; if such uniformity
of law were implemented, there would be some conflict in as far as
these kinds of programs are concerned.
It is also not in the interest of developing countries to fashion
their intellectual property laws on the basis of criteria that are derived
from the conditions and interests of the technologically advanced
countries. The guiding principles must instead be the advancement
of technological and industrial development, and thus must include
local working and compulsory licensing requirements, the allowance
of parallel imports, and the control of technology licensing restrictions
and other restrictive business practices. At this point it is necessary
to recall that a couple of years ago, perhaps the developmental aspects
in intellectual property were more interesting to the United States
than the trade aspects are at the present time. Now that the United
States is at its present level of technological development, the trade
aspects of intellectual property become more important for it than
the development aspects. This should not prevent other countries
from pursuing development objectives in preference to liberalization
objectives.
With respect to the question of counterfeit goods, the enforcement
of intellectual property rights imposed in respect of production and
international trade must be based on the substantive rights existing
in national legislation. Only the international trade aspect (with the
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goal to control trade in counterfeit products) should be a subject for
negotiations. Any enforcement measures that are agreed upon must
be carried out in the text of development objectives and must avoid
new administrative and budgetary burdens.

